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PROPORTIONAL FAULT IN MARITIME
COLLISIONS-CHARTING THE NEW COURSE
Gustave R. Dubus, HII*
I. INTRODUCTION
The historic admiralty rule of dividing damages equally in colli-
sion cases involving contributing fault by both vessels has received
its final blow. On May 19, 1975, the United States Supreme Court
handed down its decision in United States v. Reliable Transfer Co.,'
establishing a new rule which allocates liability among the parties
proportionately to the degree of fault of each party.' This article is
not intended to trace the origins of the rule of divided damages, but
will focus on an evaluation of the prospects created by the new rule
and some of the questions which it raises for practitioners.
II. THE DIVIDED DAMAGES RULE
The divided damages rule was laid down for American courts by
the Supreme Court of the United States in The Schooner Catharine
v. Dickinson3 in 1855, based on the application of the rule by English
admiralty courts4 and the lower courts of the United States.' In The
Schooner Catharine the Court concluded that both vessels in the
collision were at fault. Faced with the decision of establishing a rule
of damages for such situations, Mr. Justice Nelson, speaking for the
Court, stated: "Under the circumstances usually attending these
disasters, we think the rule dividing the loss the most just and
equitable, and as best tending to induce care and vigilance on both
sides, in the navigation." ' The Supreme Court adhered to this rule
for 120 years.7
* Member of Georgia Bar. B.A., Washington & Lee University, 1965; LL.B., University of
Georgia, 1968.
421 U.S. 397 (1975).
2 The rule is qualified with the proviso that damages will be allocated equally when the
parties are equally at fault or when the relative degrees of fault cannot be fairly measured.
Id. at 411.
' 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1855).
' See, e.g., The Woodrop-Sims, 165 Eng. Rep. 1422 (H.L. 1815); Hay v. LeNeve, 2 Shaw's
Scotch App. 395 (1824). For discussions of the earlier history of the divided damages rule see
H. BAER, ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT 217-30 (1963), 4 R. MARSDEN, BRITISH SHIP-
PING LAWS 95 (11th ed. K. McGuffie 1961), and Staring, Contribution and Division of Dam-
ages in Admiralty and Maritime Cases, 45 CAL. L. REV. 304 (1957).
' The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170, 177 (1855).
' Id. at 177-78.
' The most recent expressions before Reliance on the rule by the Supreme Court were in
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A. Criticism of the Rule and the Rationale of Reliable Transfer.
Despite the conclusion of the Supreme Court that the Rule was
"just and equitable,"' less than 20 years later the Court itself was
seeking ways to alleviate its harshness. In The Great Republic' the
Court laid the groundwork for what later became known as the
"major-minor" fault rule. In that case, while both vessels were at
fault, the fault of one bore "so little proportion to the many faults"
of the other, that the Supreme Court concluded the vessel only
technically at fault should not share the consequences, i.e., divided
damages. ° In The City of New York" the major-minor fault concept
was articulated in the following manner:
Where fault on the part of one vessel is established by uncontrad-
icted testimony, and such fault is, of itself, sufficient to account
for the disaster, it is not enough for such vessel to raise a doubt
with regard to the management of the other vessel. There is some
presumption at least adverse to its claim, and any reasonable
doubt with regard to the propriety of the conduct of such other
vessel should be resolved in its favor. 2
While not a criticism per se, it should be noted, as the Supreme
Court did in Reliable Transfer,3 that as early as 1910, the maritime
nations of the world proposed a rule of proportional fault in the
Brussels Collision Liability Convention. 4 The Reliable Transfer
Court observed that the United States was virtually alone among
the maritime nations in not adhering to the Convention. 5
Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597 (1963) and in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn
Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952). In 1972 the Court granted certiorari in
Union Oil Co. v. The San Jacinto, 409 U.S. 140 (1972), to reconsider the divided damages
rule. The Court did not, however, reach the issue because of its conclusion that one of the
vessels was totally free of fault. Id. at 146.
The Schooner Catherine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170, 177 (1855).
90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 20 (1874).
Id. at 35.
" 147 U.S. 72 (1893).
" Id. at 85. The Court further refined the rule in The Victory & The Plymothian, 168 U.S.
410 (1897), by holding that when the fault of one vessel is obvious and inexcusable, then its
evidence must clearly and convincingly establish fault of the other vessel. Id. at 423. See also
The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186 (1895).
,3 421 U.S. at 403.
, International Convention for the Purpose of Establishing Uniformity in Certain Rules
Regarding Collision, done Sept. 23, 1910, [1913] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 76 (CMD. 6667)
[hereinafter cited as Brussels Collision Convention].
," 421 U.S. at 403-04. Gilmore and Black have pointed out that the failure of the United
States to adhere to the Brussels Convention has encouraged forum shopping. G. GILMORE &
C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 529 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK].
It is interesting to note that the primary opposition to ratification of the Convention by the
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The lower federal courts became increasingly disenchanted with
the divided damages rule. The chief critic was Judge Learned Hand,
who described the rule as a "vestigial relic."'" In a dissenting opin-
ion in National Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. United States,'I Judge Hand
leveled this blast: "An equal division in this case would be plainly
unjust; they ought to be divided in some such proportion as five to
one. And so they could be but for our obstinate cleaving to the
ancient rule which has been abrogated by nearly all civilized na-
tions."' 8 Pointing out that the major-minor fault rule was of little
help in reaching a just conclusion, Judge Hand went on to state:
[T]he doctrine that a court should not look too jealously at the
navigation of one vessel, when the faults of the other are glaring,
is in the nature of a sop to Cerberus. It is no doubt better than
nothing; but it is inadequate to reach the heart of the matter, and
constitutes a constant temptation to courts to avoid a decision on
the merits. 9
Additionally, the weight of the textbook The Law of Admiralty
was thrown against the ancient rule when its author suggested in the
1957 edition that the Supreme Court could "'confess error' and
adopt the proportional fault doctrine" 0 in an appropriate case. This
admonition was repeated in the 1975 edition," just in time for cita-
tion in the Reliable Transfer opinion."
Making full reference to the many criticisms of the rule and not-
ing in particular the unsatisfactory performance of the major-minor
fault rule,13 the Supreme Court concluded that equal division of
damages was only where each vessel's fault was approximately
equal or where proportionate degrees of fault could not be measured
on a rational basis.2 4
United States came from cargo interests. These interests feared prejudice to their rights in
recovering their entire losses from either vessel. See Bue, Admiralty Law in the Fifth Cir-
cuit-A Compendium for Practitioners: 11, 5 HoUSTON L. REV. 767, 896 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Bue].
,1 Oriental Trading & Transp. Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 173 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1949).
17 183 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1950).
" Id. at 410 (dissenting opinion).
" Id. Other courts have described the divided damages rule as folpows: Tank Barge Hy-
grade, Inc. v. The Tug Gatco New Jersey, 250 F.2d 485, 488 (3d Cir. 1957) ("arbitrary" and
"archaic and frequently unjust"); Marine Fuel Transfer Corp. v. The Ruth, 231 F.2d 319, 321
(2d Cir. 1956) ("illogical"); Ahlgreen v. Red Star Towing & Transp. Co., 214 F.2d 618, 620
(2d Cir. 1954) ("unfair").
,' G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 441 (1st ed. 1957).
21 GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 15, at 531.
" 421 U.S. at 410.
' Id. at 406.
2 Id. at 407.
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The new rule poses three basic questions for admiralty lawyers in
this country. First, will the new rule be applied retroactively or
prospectively? Second, what effect will the rule have on the major-
minor fault doctrine? Third, how will the courts apply the
Pennsylvania rule 5 in light of the new rule? The remainder of this
article will be devoted to a treatment of these questions.
B. Retroactive or Prospective Applicability
Litigants in pending collision cases and parties to collisions not
yet in litigation will wish to know whether the new rule affects them
or will only apply to collisions postdating Reliable Transfer. While
most Supreme Court decisional law on retroactivity involves crimi-
nal law and criminal procedure, there is precedent in the civil arena
which provides some insight into this area. In the admiralty field
itself, the Court dealt with the retroactivity of a prior decision in
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson.5 There the Court considered the retroac-
tivity of its decision in Rodrique v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,"
in which it had determined that state law provided the only remedy
for wrongful death occurring on an artificial island on the Continen-
tal Shelf outside the territorial limits of the state. If Rodrique ap-
plied retroactively, the claim of the plaintiff in Chevron, who had
suffered injuries on such an artificial island, would be barred by the
state statute of limitations.
In concluding that the Rodrique decision would not be applied
retroactively, the Court set forth three factors which it felt must be
considered in determining the issue of retroactivity in civil cases: (1)
the decision being considered must establish a new principle of law,
"either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may
have relied, . . . or by deciding an issue of first impression whose
resolution was not clearly foreshadowed";" (2) the merits and de-
merits in each case must be weighed by looking to "the prior history
of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether re-
trospective operation will further or retard its operation";2 9 and (3)
the "inequity imposed by retroactive operation"30 must be exam-
ined. The traditional general rule favors retroactive application of
2 See The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1874); notes 42-75 infra and accompanying
text.
26 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
395 U.S. 352 (1969).
404 U.S. at 106.
Id. at 106-07.
1 Id. at 107.
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the overruling decision.3' It is likely that all three of the Chevron
factors must be satisfied before a decision will be given prospective
application only.
Certainly, only the first factor could qualify Reliable Transfer for
prospective application only. As noted above, the decision overrules
clear past precedent, sanctioned by the Supreme Court since 1855.
Although in 1972 the Court granted certiorari in Union Oil Co. v.
The San Jacinto32 to reconsider the divided damages rule, there was
no indication from that case (in which this issue was not reached),
nor from other cases considered in the past 25 years, that the Court
was dissatisfied with the rule.
As for the second Chevron factor, the Court referred for guidance
to Linkletter v. Walker,3 the decision denying retroactive applica-
tion to the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio.34 In Linkletter the
Court enunciated a tripartite set of exceptions to the general rule
favoring retroactivity: (1) where justifiable reliance on decision is
present and substantial harm results to those so relying; (2) where
the purpose of the overruling decision can be effectuated without
retroactivity; and (3) where retroactive operation might greatly bur-
den the administration of justice.3 5 It seems unlikely that parties
seeking to invoke the divided damages rule for collisions occurring
prior to Reliable Transfer will be able to qualify under the first
exception, since navigators can hardly claim justifiable reliance in
situations where they ought to avoid collision at all cost. The third
exception also would not appear to offer safe harbor, since the vol-
ume of collision cases is relatively small 3 and the problems of ad-
ministration of justice can hardly be compared with the immense
problems engendered by the flood of habeas corpus petitions which
might have ensued from the retroactive application of Mapp. With
regard to the second exception, the small number of cases which
militated against the third exception would seem to give some sup-
port to the proposition that the purpose of the overruling decision
can be effectuated without retroactivity. In all likelihood, the
Court's goals in Reliable Transfer were to enunciate an equitable
rule of allocating damages according to fault and to prevent colli-
5, See Annot., 14 L. Ed. 2d 992, 1003 (1965) (annotation to Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618 (1965).
- 409 U.S. 140 (1972).
- 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
- 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
381 U.S. at 622-29.
" American Maritime Cases digested only 22 cases under its "Divided Damages" heading
in its 5 year index for 1968-1972. Nine cases were indexed in 1973 and 1974.
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sions. Retroactive application will affect relatively few cases and
certainly will not prevent past collisions. If Linkletter's exceptions
are the criteria for the second factor set forth in Chevron, then there
may be some argument for nonretroactivity.
The third Chevron factor, the inequity imposed by retroactive
application, appears to be the major stumbling block for those who
would advocate prospective application. No parties will enter con-
tracts relying on the divided damages rule, nor can a party to a
collision take the position that he did or did not do something in
anticipation of the application of the old rule. In fact Reliable
Transfer is intended to eliminate what critics believed to be an
inequitable rule, i.e., the nonapportionment of damages according
to degrees of fault.37 Thus, unless some equitable argument against
retroactive application can be made, it appears that a party seeking
to invoke the divided damages rule for a pre-Reliable Transfer colli-
sion must founder on the shoals of the third factor in Chevron.
C. The Major-Minor Fault Rules
As previously noted, the Supreme Court became concerned with
the harshness of the divided damages rule in the 1890's. It therefore
evolved the major-minor fault rule as a means of avoiding applica-
tion of the divided damages rule in cases where the relative degrees
of fault were greatly disproportionate.3 8 In considering the effective-
ness of the major-minor fault rule, the Reliable Transfer Court was
openly critical, stating that it "simply replaces one unfairness with
another. 39 Hence its utility could be found only in relation to a
situation where application of the divided damages rule would pro-
duce a vastly inequitable result.
What, then, is the future of the major-minor fault rule, now that
divided damages have been consigned to the realm of legal history?
It seems quite likely that the passing of its raison d'Otre will be
sufficient to abolish the rule as well. In addition to the critical terms
noted above, the Supreme Court also made the following observa-
tion: "That a vessel is primarily negligent does not justify its shoul-
dering all responsibility, nor excuse the slightly negligent vessel
from bearing any liability at all.""0 The obvious dissatisfaction with
the results produced by the major-minor fault rule, combined with
the demise of divided damages, leads strongly to the conclusion that
31 421 U.S. at 405-07.
The City of New York, 147 U.S. 72, 85 (1893).
" 421 U.S. at 406.
,0 Id.
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Reliable Transfer implicitly abolished the rule.
As most collisions in one way or another result from a "concatena-
tion of events"4' involving questionable activities by all parties, no
doubt there will continue to be questions of contributing and non-
contributing fault. It can be anticipated that numerous litigants will
argue that although they may have been at fault in some way, their
fault really did not contribute to the collision. However, their bur-
den of absolving themselves may now be greater, since courts need
not avoid a 50-50 split, but are free to apportion liability in accord-
ance with the degree of fault found. Thus, a party whose fault may
relate to another's in a ratio as low as 1:10 or 1:20 will probably find
that he too will have to contribute to the damages unless he can
show that he was not at fault or that his fault was not a cause of
the collision.
D. The Pennsylvania Rule
Discussion of contributing fault leads almost inevitably to a con-
sideration of the Pennsylvania rule. This rule deals with the situa-
tion in which one or more of the parties to a collision is in violation
of a statutory rule intended to prevent collisions. It was first stated
by the Supreme Court in The Pennsylvania," as follows:
But when, as in this case, a ship at the time of a collision is in
actual violation of a statutory rule intended to prevent collisions,
it is no more than a reasonable presumption that the fault, if not
the sole cause, was at least a contributory cause of the disaster. In
such a case the burden rests upon the ship of showing not merely
that her fault might not have been one of the causes, or that it
probably was not, but that it could not have been. 3
In the approximately 100 years since the first application of the
Pennsylvania rule, much litigation and debate has ensued with re-
gard to the proper interpretation of the rule. Prior to ascending to
the bench in the Southern District of Texas, Carl 0. Bue provided
practitioners with an outstanding guide to the Pennsylvania rule, as
part of his thoroughgoing review of Fifth Circuit admiralty law." In
treating the Pennsylvania rule, Judge Bue did not confine his review
to the Fifth Circuit, but outlined the views of all the maritime
" This phrase has been a favorite of the admiralty bar since used by Judge Irving Kaufman
in Cargill, Inc. v. City of Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821, 822 (2d Cir. 1968).
42 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1874).
, Id. at 136.
" Bue, supra note 15, at 798-802.
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circuits45 which had considered the problem. In general, he found
that the circuits broke down into (1) those that require strict com-
pliance with statutes or regulations, and hence applied the rule
strictly, and (2) those which took a more liberal view, looking to
what was reasonably required by the statute and refusing to apply
it where the violation did not contribute to the collision."
Bue's 1968 study analyzed the history of each circuit's handling
of Pennsylvania rule violations and generally placed each circuit in
the categories of strict or liberal interpretation of the rule with gen-
erous supporting comment and data. In keeping with the scope of
the present article, the author will merely refer the reader to the Bue
study, bring it up to 1975 for each circuit and then endeavor to
predict the future of the rule in light of Reliable Transfer.
1. First Circuit.
The First Circuit fell into the liberal category on this issue by
virtue of its decision in Seaboard Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Rederi
AB/DISA.47 It held that, in applying the Pennsylvania rule, reasona-
ble probabilities should prevail, and not every vessel guilty of statu-
tory fault had to meet the burden of eliminating any causal connec-
tion to the collision.48 No recent decisions indicative of any change
in this view have been handed down in the intervening seven years.
2. Second Circuit.
Judge Bue placed the Second Circuit in the group which applies
a strict standard, despite a few cases to the contrary. 9 In Verdon v.
Stakeboat No. 21 the court required a showing of impossibility that
the statutory violation was a cause of the collision. While in Afran
Transport Co. v. United States5 the Second Circuit limited the
Pennsylvania rule to violations of mandatory statutes or regula-
tions, and not mere cautionary suggestions, the strict burden to
show that the violation could not have been a contributing cause
was reaffirmed in Petition of Long.52
11 Id. at 802-07. The Eighth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits are the nonmaritime
circuits.
See id.
213 F.2d 772 (1st Cir. 1954).
Id. at 775.
4g Compare The San Simeon, 63 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1933) with The Mabel, 35 F.2d 731 (2d
Cir. 1929).
340 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1965).
" 435 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1970).
12 439 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1971).
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3. Third Circuit.
The Third Circuit falls under the restrictive heading based upon
its conclusion that the major-minor fault rule could not be applied
where there was a violation of a statutory requirement intended to
prevent collisions. 3 While there have been no circuit level decisions
in the intervening years bearing directly upon this point, the Fed-
eral Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania cited the Third
Circuit's continuing disregard of major-minor fault in statutory vio-
lation situations in Tug Management Corp. v. Jacquet.5 1
4. Fourth Circuit.
In 1968, Judge Bue noted that the Fourth Circuit had character-
ized itself as being of the liberal view, at least with respect to cases
involving proper lookout. Based upon Anthony v. International
Paper Co.15 and United States v. Steamship Soya Atlantic" this
interpretation would appear to be true. Bue contrasted these cases
with the holdings of Rowe v. Brooks5 and Gary v. United States Oil
Screw Echo5 where a more constrictive view of the Pennsylvania
rule was expressed. In the case of Chesapeake Bay Bridge & Tunnel
District v. Lauritzen59 the Fourth Circuit opted for the restrictive
view. It held that a statutory violation created a strong inference
imposing a heavy burden of showing by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the violation did not contribute to the collision. On the
other hand the Federal Court of the Eastern District of Virginia, in
attempting to follow the lead of the circuit court of appeals, reached
a more liberal conclusion in Tiger Shipping Co. v. The Tug
Carville.8 0 The most that can be said as of 1975 is that the Fourth
Circuit has one foot in each category.
5. Fifth Circuit.
Bue gave extensive treatment to the Fifth Circuit, finding it to be
quite liberal. In the Fifth Circuit the rule was declared not to be one
of liability but merely one of shifting the burden of proof, as in
Green v. Crow.' As of 1968, the most recent Fifth Circuit decision
"' See Boyer v. The Merry Queen, 202 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1953); Tide Water Associated Oil
Co. v. The Syosset, 203 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1953).
" 330 F. Supp. 486, 502-503 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
289 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1961).
- 330 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1964).
57 329 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1964).
334 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1964).
" 404 F.2d 1001, 1007 (4th Cir. 1968).
" 381 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. Va. 1974).
It 243 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1957).
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was China Union Lines, Ltd. v. A. 0. Anderson & Co. ,62 in which the
more relaxed interpretation again held sway. There is nothing since
to indicate a contrary course.
6. Sixth Circuit.
As of 1968, the Sixth Circuit was clearly in the range of strict
application as exemplified by such cases as Eastern Steamship Co.
v. International Harvester Co.,"3 Federal Insurance Co. v. Steam-
ship Royalton,"' and Reiss Steamship Co. v. Compagnia Fletera
Cajotamil, S.A. 5 Nothing in the intervening time suggests a change
of this view.
7. Seventh Circuit.
The Seventh Circuit was also placed in the strict category, based
primarily on Commercial Transport Corp. v. Martin Oil Service,
Inc.6 The recent case of Complaint of Charles N. Wasson 7 rein-
forces the view that the Seventh Circuit applies the Pennsylvania
rule strictly, since the court in that case required the violator to
show that the violation could not have contributed to the collision.
8. Ninth Circuit.
Judge Bue noted that while earlier Ninth Circuit cases"8 had ap-
plied the rule strictly, a softening in the rule had been noted in
States Steamship Co. v. Permanente Steamship Corp." and in
Pacific Tow Boat Co. v. States Marine Corp.70 States Steamship Co.
held that the violator did not have the burden of establishing that
"its fault could not by any stretch of the imagination have had any
causal relation to the collision no matter how speculative, improba-
ble or remote."7' This trend has not, however, continued into the
1970's. In Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Gay Cottons," the Ninth
62 364 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 933 (1967); see Hess Shipping Corp.
v. The S.S. Charles Lykes, 417 F.2d 346, 351 (5th Cir. 1969) (dissenting opinion). Chief Judge
Brown's forceful dissent describes the rule as "stringent." Id. at 352.
43 189 F.2d 472 (6th Cir. 1951).
4' 312 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1963).
374 F.2d 117 (6th Cir. 1967).
61 374 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1967).
67 495 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1974).
41 The Denali, 105 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1939); The Silver Palm, 94 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1937),
cert denied, 304 U.S. 576 (1938); The Beaver, 219 F. 134 (9th Cir. 1915), aff'd sub nor. Lie
v. San Francisco & Portland S.S. Co., 243 U.S. 291 (1917).
" 231 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1956).
70 276 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1960).
7' 231 F.2d at 86.
72 414 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1969).
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Circuit Court of Appeals again opted to apply the rule "very
strictly." The Federal Court of the Northern District of California
took this seriously in United States v. States Steamship Co., 3 wher-
ein it held that the burden of proof under the Pennsylvania rule
could not be avoided by incantation of the major-minor fault rule
and that the burden of the Ninth Circuit was a heavy one indeed. '
In the very recent case of Ishizaki Kisen v. United States,75 the
Ninth Circuit has even declared that the Pennsylvania rule does
more than merely shift the burden of proof, but that it is a substan-
tive rule of law requiring a very heavy burden and that in most
instances it will impose liability.76
In 1968 one could divide the circuits almost evenly into the strict
and the liberal schools on the application of the Pennsylvania rule.
With some shifting in the Fourth Circuit and a definite lurch to the
strict side by the Ninth, only the First and Fifth Circuits remain in
the liberal camp. Inasmuch as one of the Supreme Court's goals in
discarding the divided damages rule was to avoid a harsh result
based on the Pennsylvania rule," violators may find it even harder
to escape the consequences of their acts when their punishment can
fit the crime. In view of the utility of the Pennsylvania rule over its
century of existence, it would seem that courts applying it strictly
can now reach equitable results.
III. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The rapid expansion of "flag of convenience fleets" since World
War II, and in particular the participation of companies controlled
from the United States,78 has meant that in most instances at least
one if not both of the vessels involved in a collision will be flying a
foreign flag. As the Supreme Court noted,7" most of the major mari-
time nations have adhered to the Brussels Collision Liability Con-
vention of 1910,80 bringing themselves within the rule of proportional
fault.8 Thus, there was the temptation to forum shop, depending on
73 1972 A.M.C. 642 (N.D. Cal.).
7, Id. at 646.
M 1975 A.M.C. 287 (9th Cir.).
76 Id. at 292.
77 421 U.S. at 406.
" Maritime Transport Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment, OECD Study on Flags of Convenience, 4 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 231 (1973).
7' 421 U.S. at 403.
Brussels Collision Convention supra note 14.
9' Article 4 of the Convention provides in part:
If two or more vessels are in fault the liability of each vessel shall be in proportion
to the eegree of the faults respectively committed. Provided that if, having regard
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the circumstances of the various parties, with those bearing the
greater amount of fault seeking to invoke United States law in the
hope of dividing damages. Prior to Reliable Transfer, American
courts found no difficulty in applying the proportional fault rule of
the Brussels Convention to collisions in international waters or in
the territorial waters of a signatory state involving foreign vessels
and owners who were subjects of signatory states.82
It should be noted that the Brussels Convention also applies a
different rule than the United States applies with regard to the
rights and liabilities of cargo aboard colliding vessels.83 American
law permitted cargo interests to recover the loss in full from the
other vessel, with the other vessel having the right to add cargo's
recovery to its loss to be divided with the carrying vessel. The Brus-
sels Convention makes cargo accept the same proportion of fault as
its carrier.84 Thus, shipowners sought the application of the Brussels
Convention, while cargo owners preferred the United States rule.
The Reliable Transfer decision makes no reference to this point, but
shipowners will doubtless urge that there is no logic in applying
proportional fault to collision issues and not to cargo. Cargo inter-
ests no doubt will argue that the application of proportional fault
to collision issues does not require that the same rule apply to cargo,
inasmuch as cargo is innocent of any active wrongdoing. However,
the historic concept of vessel and cargo constituting a joint venture
may militate against such an interpretation. Since the Supreme
Court looked to the Brussels Convention in deciding Reliable
Transfer, it may, if faced with an appropriate case, enunciate a new
rule for cargo by reference to the Convention.
IV. PROSPECTS AND CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's embarkation on a new era of damage alloca-
titn in maritime collision cases will not, in all likelihood, result in
great changes in the practice of the average attorney. One should
be alert, of course, to new developments in apportioning liability
according to degree of fault not only in collision cases, but also in
to the circumstances, it is not possible to establish the degree of the respective
faults, or if it appears that the faults are equal, the liability shall be apportioned
equally.
Id. art. 4; see 421 U.S. at 403 n.6.
See, e.g., The Mandu, 102 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1939).
Brussels Collision Convention, supra note 14, art. 4.
Id.; see Anglo-American Grain Co. v. The S/T Mina D'Amico, 169 F. Supp. 908, 910
(E.D. Va. 1959). This, of course, accounts for the opposition of cargo interests to ratification
by the United States of the Convention, as discussed in note 15 supra.
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noncollision property damage and personal injury and death cases,
as well as to the new ground being plowed in the areas of indemnity
and contribution." Most attorneys practicing collision law in the
United States have foreseen the possibility that proportional fault
in collision cases might someday become the law of this country. As
suggested by the Supreme Court, it may discourage forum shopping
to some extent by bringing American law into line with the nations
following the Brussels Convention.86 Counsel should not expect re-
troactivity in most cases. As noted above, collisions involving dam-
age to or loss of cargo may generate litigation as to the continued
viability of the rule of joint and several liability of all vessels in-
volved. There will certainly be arguments by counsel for shipowners
that the international rule of the Brussels Convention is now the
most appropriate.
The two major changes one may anticipate involve major-minor
fault and the Pennsylvania rule. In all probability the major-minor
fault rule has been consigned to the realm of legal history along with
divided damages. As for the Pennsylvania rule, some attorneys feel
that it too has been abolished. This writer thinks that, to the con-
trary, we may and should expect a furthering of the strict applica-
tion of the Pennsylvania rule, since the prime criticism of harshness
when applied along with divided damages has now disappeared.
This article has attempted to survey the impact of Reliable
Transfer on the international shipping community and in particular
to analyze the prospects for maritime collision practitioners and
their clients. Hopefully it has provided some "Sailing Directions"
which will be of assistance to the courtroom navigator in avoiding
the rocks and shoals of the new course in collision litigation.
11 For a treatment of some of the prospects see Villareal, Halycan to Ryan to Weyerhaeuser
to Cooper-Where Do We Go From Here?, 6 J. MAR. L. & COM. 593 (1975).
" For an interesting battle involving the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction, with consid-
eration given to the Brussels Collision Convention, see Poseidon Schiffahrt G.m.b.H. v. The
M/S Netuno, 335 F. Supp. 684, 688 (S.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd, 474 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1973).
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